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INTRODUCTION
Despite the general belief in a physical universe governed
by natural law1, human beings tend to consider themselves as
free subjects endowed with free will. The sensation of being
voluntarily in control of a large proportion of one’s own ac-
tions, behaviours and life is a subjective, intuitive, and perva-
sive characteristic of human experience2. Human beings ex-
perience freedom, in the sense of free will, as the power to
determine their actions. This is one of the basic and constitu-
tive experiences of our life, and it shapes our personal and
moral identity for everyone. It is in fact through voluntary
decisions that we affirm and show who we are compared to
what we would or could have been3.
Nonetheless, in the last decades a growing body of evi-
dence from cognitive and behavioural neuroscience has
deeply questioned classical views of free will, opening an on-
going scientific debate4. Particularly, neuroscientific discov-
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eries have raised the concern that decisional processes of hu-
man beings are less free than previously believed. Moreover,
neuroscientists conceptualized the concept of freedom main-
ly as the capacity to inhibit one’s behavioural urges3.
The possibility to evaluate to what extent a specific action
is the result of a defendant’s “free choice” is often considered
the principal matter of investigation in forensic psychiatry
criminal responsibility assessment5. Hence the theoretical
debate on free will constitutes a topic of great interest for
forensic psychiatrists as different views of free will could ac-
cordingly affect a defendant’s accountability in different
ways. In this sense, the concept of free will is crucial in foren-
sic psychiatry where at present evaluations rely mainly on
notions such as sense of agency, capability to do otherwise
and to act for an intelligible reason. Clearly, the notions used
also depend, at least in part, on the jurisdiction: different le-
gal systems may have different standards for insanity, e.g.,
The M’Naghten Rule, or The Model Penal Code’s standard6.
In addition, the notion of free will deeply influences our eth-
ical view of the world, and is central to the systems of law, ad-
judication, and punishment that inherits much of its structure
from our moral views1.
In the present paper we will argue for an operationaliza-
tion of “free will” in forensic psychiatric assessments of crim-
inal responsibility, using a framework derived from decision-
making competency research7. The outline of the article is as
follows. First, we will briefly consider the concept of free will
from a neuroscientific perspective. Specifically, we will pro-
vide an overview of the concept of free will from a neurosci-
entific point of view, defined as the “subject’s awareness of
the freedom to act”. Next, we consider the concept of free
will more closely, concluding that the concept is both too
controversial and vague to be used in psychiatric assess-
ments. Notably, this does not in itself mean that we conclude
that free will does not exist, or that the concept is meaning-
less; we argue that, as such, it is not sufficiently helpful in as-
sessments of criminal responsibility to provide guidance in
this particular – yet important – context. Then, we will pro-
pose the application of the decision-making capacity model
to conceptualize free will and to guide the forensic psychia-
try criminal responsibility evaluation. Finally, we consider
some advantages of this framework and draw conclusions.
FREE WILL AND NEUROSCIENCES
In the last decades an important contribution to the de-
bate on free will has come from neurosciences. Neuroscien-
tists tended to ignore the traditional metaphysical perspec-
tive and focused on the role of the central nervous system in
decision-making and human freedom of choice. This ap-
proach meant a radical epistemological change, since it used
a brain sciences approach to advance a discussion on a theme
that has long been considered the realm of philosophy.
In fact, several brain areas and circuits have been related
to (elements of) free will. The brain’s parietal and medial
frontal lobes have been implicated in the representation of
intention and in initiation of self-generated motor activity8.
Pre-motor areas have been proposed to be involved in un-
conscious internally generated voluntary actions9-11. A first
insight into the neurophysiological correlations of intention-
al action has been provided by a seminal study by Libet and
colleagues, which showed that the human brain begins to
prepare the action before the subject becomes aware of the
decision to act12.
Some insight into the study method will follow to better
understand further advances as well as criticism.
The experiment implied measuring the readiness poten-
tial (RP), a slow electrical change of the EEG sequence
which originated from the supplementary motor area
(SMA), a cortical region which is involved in the preparation
of the motor sequence, and begins, it turned out, its electrical
activity half a second or more before a voluntary movement
is performed13. Participants were asked to hold their gaze to
an oscilloscope clock which completed its rotation in 2.56
seconds. Then, they were required to flick or flex their finger
or wrist whenever they freely wanted to do so, and to report
the precise moment in which they became aware of the in-
tention to perform the action, by remembering the exact po-
sition of the clock spot (this moment was called W, because it
was the expression of the conscious experience of the will).
The authors found that the RP started 550 ms before the sub-
jects became conscious of their decision to act and conclud-
ed that human actions were associated with a preconscious
activity of the brain. As a consequence, it has been argued
that conscious intentions are not at the origin of our volun-
tary behaviour; nevertheless, they arise before a movement
takes place, about 150 to 200 ms before its beginning as indi-
cated by the electromiogram (EMG)12, probably meaning
that there is still time for consciousness to suppress the
movement before it actually takes place14.
These findings have also been interpreted as an empirical
confirmation of cerebral determinism, which postulates that
every action is the unavoidable product of previous brain
events, which occur following natural rules, and considered
to imply that human beings are never completely free, or un-
conditioned, when they decide to do something, except for
the possibility to inhibit their behaviour. It has been offered
that Libet substituted the concept of “free will” with that of
“free won’t”15.
In interpreting these results one must bear in mind that
the RP is present also when the participant withheld the ac-
tion, thus questioning its specificity as a precursor to a vol-
untary action16. Moreover, Brass and Haggard17 showed that
the intentional inhibition of action was associated with the
activation of the anterior fronto-median cortex and of the
anterior insula. Further insight into the mechanisms undely-
ing intentional behaviour have been provided by Haggard
and Eimer18 who showed that conscious intentions were cor-
related to a lateralized RP (LRP) which reflects hand-specif-
ic motor preparation. 
The existence of cerebral structures whose activation can
be shown long before an action takes place was provided by
Soon et al.19 who found prefrontal and parietal cortex brain
activity up to 10 seconds before the subject’s awareness.
Even though these data may not provide conclusive evidence
regarding the (non)existence of free will, together such re-
sults suggest the involvement of a higher level control net-
work in shaping an upcoming decision before it becomes
conscious.
Despite the aforementioned lines of research shedding
light on neural and electrophysiological correlates of inten-
tional action and inhibition, some authors raised skepticisms
and criticism20. For example, Libet’s paradigm has been
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deemed not the best method to examine conscious intention
of motor actions, since post hoc reconstructions strongly in-
fluence our experience of conscious decisions21. Others22,23,
affirmed that Libet’s Experiment is not an unambiguous
demonstration of the unconscious motor preparation, be-
cause the RP represents an indicator of a movement which is
considered for the future, rather than one that it is supposed
to start immediately. One of the conceptual criticisms points
out that results which deal with fingers or wrist can be hard-
ly informative of complex decisions taken in the real
world14,24. In addition, we believe that another limit to the
generalizability of these results is represented by the neglect
of the emotional component associated with making a deci-
sion and expecting its consequences. The experimental con-
dition, in fact, does not take into account the emotionally
charged situation that often characterizes the circumstances
of criminal aggression.
Summarizing, neuroscience has provided data that, ac-
cording to some, prove that free will is non-existent. In any
case, neurosciences – and neuroscientists – have made the
topic of free will more controversial. In addition, the evi-
dence provided by neurophysiological and neuroimaging
studies shows that action intention and inhibition have spe-
cific biological correlates which partly precedes the decision
awareness. However, to what extent such a model could be
informative and guide the evaluation of complex criminal
behaviours in a forensic setting, is still a heatedly debated is-
sue.
FREE WILL, THE WILL, AND MENTAL DISORDERS
A link between freedom and mental disorders has been
supposed and has survived for a long time, considering that
the Fourth Edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual
of Mental Disorders (DSM-IV-TR) included an important
loss of freedom as one of the possible defining features of
mental disorders25. Nonetheless, DSM-526, for unstated rea-
sons, no longer mentions such a concept for defining psychi-
atric disorders and their complexity. A possible explanation
of this choice relies on the idea that this loss of freedom is al-
ready included in the notion of disability27,28.
Nor is it clear whether the loss of freedom concept was re-
ferred to practical impairments or to the freedom of the
mind or free will29. Psychiatric symptoms might impair deci-
sion-making, and consequently freedom, from a practical
point of view (disabilities, like in somatic diseases) as well as
from a psychological viewpoint: affecting the freedom of
one’s mind. Regarding this last aspect, mental disorders are
commonly considered as being associated with compromised
free will. Because of the intimate relationship between the
concepts of free will and responsibility, alterations in psychi-
atric patients’ free will could consequently reduce responsi-
bility.
However, to our knowledge, there are no legal systems or
criteria assuming lack of free will, per se, to be the reason for
non-accountability in criminal trials. Noteworthy, free will is
generally conceived in a different way from the concept of
liberty or freedom which includes the absence of external co-
ercion, conditioning and the limitation of possibilities30.
The will is not only a topic in philosophy, but certainly al-
so in psychopathology. Aboulia, impulse control, agorapho-
bia, and obsessions have been initially conceptualized as
“pathological disorders of the will”31. A defect of volition
was also central to Kraepelin’s notion of dementia praecox –
the forerunner of Bleuler’s schizophrenia– which he consid-
ered to be ultimately associated with a loss of will32. Howev-
er, after the turn of the century interest on this topic began
to decline;“the more likely explanation is that the will be-
came a casualty of fashion, and of the anti-will view enter-
tained by psychoanalysis and behaviourism. To its decline al-
so contributed the anti-rationalism and pessimism that ap-
peared in the wake of the First World War and the accept-
ance of mechanistic and neurological explanations for the
disorders of motility (e.g. tics, forced movements, stereotypes,
etc.) seen after the epidemics of encephalitis lethargic”31.
Nonetheless, in the last decades there has been a renewed
interest in the concept of will, particularly free will, which has
been differently described and conceptualized.
According to Walter33 free will is composed of three parts.
The first component is the presence of alternative possibili-
ties: to act freely the subject must be able to act otherwise.
Secondly, he must act (or choose) for an intelligible reason.
Lastly, he must be the originator (causal source) of his action.
All these three aspects may be compromised in mental dis-
orders, which can undermine the possibility to choose be-
tween alternatives, affect the intentional aspect of behaviour,
and alter the sense of agency29. Regarding the ability to do
otherwise, the paradigmatic case is perhaps that of obsessive
compulsive disorder, in which the patient is compelled to act
the compulsions and has difficulty in stopping intrusive ac-
tions or thoughts, although it is usually possible for her/him
to inhibit, or at least postpone, the compulsive behaviour.
Therefore, a better example may be: acts influenced by a
commanding auditory hallucination that cannot be dis-
obeyed, as they may, e.g., occur in schizophrenia. In such an
instance, the will is ‘hijacked’ by the voice that makes a pa-
tient choose a particular course of action (34), or the irra-
tional movements of catatonia may be an example of the im-
pairment of acting for an intelligible reason. Finally, the ac-
tions which follow a manic state probably reflect how the
person cannot be considered the genuine source (originator)
of the action29. In sum, based on this tripartite free will
framework proposed by Walter, we can conclude that mental
disorders may compromise free will –but exactly when and
how they do so is not very clear, and open to interpretation.
FREE WILL, CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY AND
DECISION-MAKING CAPACITY
Based on our analysis so far, we can conclude that, firstly,
compromised free will is often considered central to legal in-
sanity, and, secondly, free will may indeed be affected by
mental illness. But does this render free will a helpful con-
cept in actual psychiatric assessments of criminal responsi-
bility? We don’t feel this is the case. Firstly, the very existence
of free will is contested by, among others, neuroscientists, us-
ing arguments that are, e.g., based on Libet-style experi-
ments. Secondly, although the notion of free will can be re-
lated to mental disorders, as was shown using Walter’s tri-
partite framework, the concept – and how exactly it is relat-
ed to psychopathology – remains vague. Thirdly, although
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free will is often informally used as a criterion for criminal
responsibility, it is not reflected in legal insanity standards
such as M’Naghten. For instance, in the United States, to date
there is no legal criteria which include the absence of free
will as a prerequisite to reduced responsibility and account-
ability. As a consequence, some authors argue that the law
does not at all require “free will” for holding a person re-
sponsible for their criminal act35. To overcome the various
problems related to using free will regarding legal insanity, it
has been proposed to substitute the concept of free will with
the concept of autonomy36. Based on this proposal, it has
been suggested to compare the forensic evaluation for crim-
inal responsibility to the medical assessment of decisional ca-
pacity performed during the evaluation of patients’ compe-
tence to consent to treatment7. The reason is that the central
concept in patient decision-making competency is autonomy.
There are several advantages of using the concept of de-
cision-making (competency) instead of free will. Firstly,
whereas free will is considered “problematic” from a neuro-
scientific perspective, decision-making is a concept often
used in cognitive neuroscience research37. For example, deci-
sion making, which can be conceptualized as the ability to se-
lect one course of action among several possible options, re-
lies on frontal lobes functioning38. Specifically, it has been
suggested that the orbital sector is responsible for the affec-
tive value of the stimulus, the medial sector controls the mo-
tivation to act, while the lateral sector supervises the higher-
order cognitive structure of plans and goals38.
A second advantage is that the concept of free choice has
also been used to explain competent decision-making39.
Therefore, competent decision-making could be understood
as a way of “operationalizing” free choice within the context
of patient’s decision-making about treatment options. This
should not surprise us, as the philosopher Al Mele writes:
«Autonomy, as I understand it, is associated with a family of
freedom-concepts: free will, free choice, free action and the
like»39. In this line of thought, competent patient decision-
making can be conceived of in terms of autonomy, but also in
terms of free choice and free will.
Thirdly, medical assessment of decisional capacity re-
search has been widely studied across jurisdictions (which
cannot be said of legal standards on insanity, at least not to
the same degree), in particular with respect to mental ill-
ness40-43. Among possible factors associated with impaired
decision making, is cognitive dysfunction, which has been
widely acknowledged to play a major role both in psychi-
atric44-47, and nonpsychiatric48 samples. In addition, specific
groups of psychiatric patients, such as those affected by schiz-
ophrenia, have been considered particularly at risk from im-
paired decision making49-52 in spite of a considerable hetero-
geneity having been acknowledged within diagnostic
groups43,53-55. Finally, the severity of psychiatric symptoms56-
58, impaired metacognition59 and multiple environmental fac-
tors60,61, such as the complexity of the disclosed information,
the type of clinical setting, and the quality of consent forms
and disclosing procedures, have been acknowledged to affect
patients’ decisional capacity. It would be a very positive de-
velopment if research, as it has been done on patient compe-
tency using this model, could also be performed on insanity
defense evaluations in the future – clearly, some adaptations
to the model would have to be made to make it fit the foren-
sic context, see below.
Interestingly, a clinical tool has been developed to assess
patients’ decisional capacity, the MacArthur Competence
Assessment Tool for Treatment (MacCAT-T)50. This is a se-
mi-structured interview relying on a multidimensional ca-
pacity model and it assesses four abilities; a) the patients’
comprehension about the disorder’s main features and spe-
cific treatment, including potential risks and benefits; b) the
patients’ ability to acknowledge her/his medical condition
and likely consequences of treatment options; c) the pa-
tients’ ability to manipulate the disclosed information about
diagnosis in a rational and logical way, reasoning about pos-
sible everyday effects of treatments, and comparing different
treatment options.; d) the patients’ ability to take and com-
municate a treatment-related decision in a clear and consis-
tent way.
Notably, this fourpartite model has not only been studied
but also applied across many jurisdictions, in fact, even
though its origins are American, it has become an ‘interna-
tional’ framework for competency assessments, making a
fruitful exchange of experiences and ideas across nations and
legal systems possible. In our view, this is one of the most in-
teresting features of this model62. 
CONTEXTUALIZING THE MODEL
We believe that the model of competence to consent to
treatment, which is a clinical one, could provide a suitable
framework to operationalize “free will” in a sense which can
be relevant for the mental insanity assessment7) Hopefully,
using this theoretical but also practical model in insanity as-
sessments will enable the exchange of ideas in research
across jurisdictions and disciplines, just like what happened
regarding capacity to consent assessments. Yet, the model
has to be contextualized regarding the specific situation of
forensic assessments of criminal responsibility. In fact, there
are several differences between evaluations of incompetence
and insanity as well, which should be recognized. Firstly, the
assessment of criminal responsibility involves a retrospective
evaluation (the “state of mind at the time of the criminal
act”), while the evaluation of competence to consent regards
a decision which has to be made at the moment or in the im-
mediate future63. Secondly, forensic evaluations deal with a
criminal act and are performed in a juridical environment,
while informed consent acquisition is related to choosing
about a treatment in a medical setting; thirdly, the forensic
assessment aim is to ascertain that the subject can be held ac-
countable, or responsible, for the act, while the medical eval-
uation focuses on the patient autonomy regarding his/her
treatment decisions – autonomy and accountability being re-
lated, though not identical. Finally, the mental insanity as-
sessment relates to an act, which is unlawful and could be
punishable, while informed consent acquisition deals with a
choice about a medical treatment, which is legal and admis-
sible63-64.
Despite these limitations, some similarities between these
two models must be acknowledged (which, in part, depend
on the specific standard and regulations in a legal system).
Firstly, both assessments concern a normative evaluation by
a health professional of a particular act/choice by an individ-
ual. Secondly, in practice, in both assessments the decision
making process is evaluated in relation to the possible pres-
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ence and influence of a mental disorder, or, more broadly,
mental incapacity63. In the first case, in fact, competence to
consent to treatment must be verified as a prerequisite of
valid informed consent acquisition, while in the second case
forensic psychiatrists must investigate if the defendant pos-
sessed the capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of the act
and if the presence of a mental disorder influenced the deci-
sion making process that led to the act63. Thirdly, as the pa-
tient (to be considered capable to consent to treatment)
must understand his/her diagnosis, treatment and risks and
benefits, so the defendant (to be held accountable for the
crime) must demonstrate his/her ability at the moment of the
crime to have comprehended the situation, and any relevant
information. Fourthly, the patient must possess the ability to
acknowledge his/her medical condition and likely conse-
quences of treatment options; similarly the defendant must
show to have acknowledged his options or alternative possi-
bilities. As the patient must be able to manipulate the dis-
closed information and make assumptions on possible every-
day effects of treatments, and compare different treatment
alternatives, the defendant should demonstrate to have
processed information about his/her options and their possi-
ble consequences. Finally, while the patient must be able to
make a choice about his/her treatment and express it in a
clear and consistent way, the defendant must have possessed
the ability to perform or inhibit one’s behaviour (at least in
those jurisdictions in which the insanity standard includes a
control prong).
Based on the relevant similarities, we believe that the clin-
ical model of competence to consent to treatment could pro-
vide a suitable framework to conceptualize and contextual-
ize the notion of free will in forensic insanity assessments. 
In addition, in our view, the neuroscientific model of free
will could be useful mainly to support evidence regarding
deficits in the inhibitory control, while currently, it may pro-
vide less information on how the presence of a mental disor-
der could have affected the defendant’s capacity to compre-
hend the situation, appreciate his/her options and reason
about their possible consequences at the moment of the
crime. Yet, there are cases where neuroscience may also pro-
vide information regarding these issues, e.g., brain imaging in
dementia, a disorder that may also sometimes can lead to
criminal behaviour. See table 1 for neurocognitive dimen-
sions related to the four capacities, which can, in principle, al-
so be assessed by neurocognitive evaluations, and further
clarified by neurocognitive research.
CONCLUSIONS
The philosophical debate about free will is far from being
concluded. A crucial question to be addressed is if the prob-
lem of free will should constitute an issue for forensic psy-
chiatrists. Apparently, the concept expresses something cen-
tral in assessment of criminal responsibility or legal insanity.
Yet, in our opinion, the concept of free will as such is too
vague and too controversial to be helpful to guide actual as-
sessments of criminal responsibility. Still, the concept could
be operationalized and contextualized in terms of (au-
tonomous) decision-making, which could well be useful for
analyzing human behaviour. More specifically, the retrospec-
tive application of a model assessing the decisional mental
capacity processes could provide a helpful framework for the
assessment of the defendant’s accountability. The proposed
framework is not just compatible with neuroscience, the
evaluation of the components of decision-making can be in-
formed by a growing body of neuroscientific data; in contrast
to free will, decision-making is a term often used and studied
in cognitive neuroscience. This makes it possible to perform
assessments that are supported by neuroscientific views and
findings. The decisional capacity evaluation should be based
on criminal and clinical data together with the elements re-
lated to the trial, despite the mentioned limitations associat-
ed with its application in the forensic setting.
There are various possible approaches to assessments of a
defendant’s insanity, also depending on the jurisdiction. Yet,
in general, in insanity evaluations, it is relevant to examine a
defendant’s choices about courses of action at the time of the
crime. A fourpartite model to evaluate autonomous choice,
as used in assessments of competence, can be adapted to the
Table 1. Decisional capacity, clinical and forensic dimensions (for references, see text).
Clinical Forensic Neuropsychological dimensions
Understanding Diagnosis
Therapy
Wrongfulness of the act: legal
and moral aspects of the act
Attention - Concentration
Perception
Language
Memory - Learning
Appreciating Diagnosis
Therapy
The nature of and possible op-
tions in the situation (e.g., in
terms of threat, danger, risks)
Comparison
Emotions
Information processing, in partic-
ular reality testing
Motivation
Executive functions:
Abstract thinking
Working memory
Problem solving
Cognitive flexibility
Reasoning Consequential thinking
Comparative thinking
Generating consequences
Logical coherence
Consequential thinking
Comparative thinking
Generating consequences
Logical coherence
Expressing a choice In a clear and consistent way Ability to perform an action or
to inhibit one’s behavior
Motility
Associative areas
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specific context of such evaluations. We have argued that the
application of this model to evaluate decision-making in the
forensic context will be informative on how the manifesta-
tions of a mental disorder could have affected the defen-
dant’s capacity to understand the wrongfulness of the situa-
tion, acknowledge his/her options and reason about possible
consequences of his/her action at the moment of the crime.
These aspects, in fact, are extremely important to shed light
on the defendant’s “state of mind” at the time of the act and
to consequently assess his/her accountability.
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